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Mutual fund investors incur fees and expenses when they buy and hold 
mutual fund shares: these costs pay for the expenses that mutual fund managers 
sustain when providing sales services, investment advice, portfolio 
management services, fund administration, fund shares subscription and 
reimbursement services and other costs directly related to the management of a 
mutual fund. 
The Italian mutual fund industry managed at year end 2003 roughly € 
500 billion: each basis point of cost charged over the asset managed accounts 
for € 50 million of revenues for the industry. At the same time, it represents a 
drag of the same amount over the return received by investors; the effect of this 
drag is particularly noticeable in periods of low interest rates and when stock 
markets perform poorly (as it was the case during the period under 
investigation). Moreover, fund expenses are largely predictable for investors 
and management companies, which cannot be said for fund returns; lastly, if the 
market of investment management services is not perfectly competitive, fund 
expenses are also rather manageable by the mutual fund industry and 
economies of scale are expected.  
The purpose of the paper is twofold: i) to measure various cost 
aggregation and 
their composition and ii) to study the relationship of total costs with different 
factors (mainly endogenous to the fund management process) that can affect 
them and their effect in terms of cost efficiencies. 
There are many reasons for further examining the costs charged on 
mutual funds in the Italian market, further than their absolute size: 
− many analyses found little evidence of superior performance by more 
expensive funds. To the extent that these analysis are correct, a sensible 
way to select mutual funds would be choosing the less expensive ones; 
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− returns are more volatile than costs and so they can be a better predictor 
of future net performance. It is much easier to predict expensive funds 
than better performers; 
− costs represent a significant drag over the gross performance, especially 
in markets characterized by low returns and for investments 
characterized by long time horizons such as mutual fund are; 
− mutual fund investors tend to underestimate the importance of costs and 
to overestimate the importance of past returns and mutual funds return 
rankings in their investment selection decisions; a better information 
over mutual fund costs could at least partially correct the 
aforementioned bias; 
− many of the components of mutual fund costs are under the direct 
control of the management company (mainly the management fee) and 
so a big portion of mutual fund expenses is subject to the free pricing 
decisions of the management company; 
− mutual funds are prone to some potentiality for the exploitation of the 
agency relationship implied in the management relationship. Mutual 
fund managers have the incentive to give the least transparency over the 
costs generated by their decisions in order to benefit from the greatest 
freedom to exploit the conflicts at their advantage; 
− economies of scale give a measure of the excess of supply in the market 
and provide information about the management ability to reduce costs.  
 
We collected and analysed data concerning the costs of a large sample 
of Italian mutual funds in order to provide some important descriptive measures 
that are both relevant and to a large extent lacking (due to the difficulty of 
collecting data on Italian mutual fund costs for which there are no accessible 
databases). Then we developed and tested some hypotheses regarding the 
determinants of Italian mutual funds costs and efficiencies. 
 We give different contributions to the existing body of knowledgeand 
provide some important descriptive statistics on the level, composition and 
trend in the costs of Italian mutual funds (and, conversely, in the gross return 
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from managing mutual funds for the Italian mutual fund industry). Furthermore, 
we investigate the main factors (i.e. size, age, specialization of the fund etc.) 
affecting the difference in the levels of the expenses that are charged to mutual 
fund investors. We aim also at establishing a standard framework for analysing 
mutual fund costs, at least in the Italian institutional framework, trying to 
overcome the limits of most of the cost measures commonly used, which fail to 
account for the whole range of expenses incurred by mutual fund investors. We 
treat explicitly the problem of trading costs generated by the management of 
mutual funds and investigate the economies of scale of the industry using a 
translog cost function. 
 
 
 
PREVIOUS STUDIES 
 
In this Section we provide a summary of selected previous studies on 
mutual fund costs. 
Ferris and Chance (1987) model the expense ratio of a sample (around 
300 observations) of mutual funds regressing it against size, management style 
(growth, income), age, and type of distribution agreement (load/no load, 
presence of 12b-1 distribution agreements). They find that costs are negatively 
and significantly related to size, style (both growth and income) and age (the 
latter not in all the years under investigation). 
Malhotra and McLeod (1997) in a paper on mutual fund expenses study 
a large sample of equity and bond funds for the years 1992 and 1993 and find 
that the total expense ratio for equity funds is negatively and significantly 
related to fund size, to portfolio turnover, to previous year’s yield, to fund age, 
to the style dummy growth and to the number of funds in a fund complex, while 
the relationship is positive with the growth in assets, with the style dummy 
income, with the cash ratio of the fund and with the distribution variable 12b-1. 
For bond funds the total expense ratio is negatively and significantly related to 
fund size, the growth in assets, the weighted average maturity, while the 
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relationship is positive with the sales charge, with the distribution variable 12b-
1, with age, with the beta of the fund, and with the past year’s yield. 
Using a large sample of U.S. equity and bond funds in 1996, Siggelkow 
(1999) finds that the expense ratio is negatively and significantly related to fund 
size and age (both in log transformation), to past performance, to the cash ratio 
and positively related to return volatility and to fund portfolio turnover. 
Sec (2000), studies US mutual funds fees and expenses in order to 
provide summary statistics, to describe the evolution of mutual fund fees over 
time and to identify some of the factors that may affect the fees charged by 
mutual funds managers. 
The data were collected at end of years 1979, 1992, 1995, 1996, 1997, 
1998 and 1999 with regard to all open end mutual funds other than money 
market mutual funds (due to the different cost structure of the latter). The 
descriptive statistics provided in the SEC study show that both the unweighted 
and the weighted average of the expense ratio rose from 1979 to 1999; that 
international funds and specialty funds were significantly more expensive than 
other less specialized funds categories; that younger funds tended to have 
higher costs than fund that are in existence for more than 5 years; that bigger 
funds have lower expense ratios than smaller funds. Employing data of 8901 
funds for the year 1999, Sec (200) found: an inverse and statistically significant 
relationship between expenses and fund assets, fund family size and fund 
family number, fund age, and categorical variables of specialization (domestic 
equity, hybrid funds, international equity, specialty fund) while the relationship 
with expenses was positive and statistically significant for the number of 
holdings, the turnover ratio, the categorical variable index fund and institutional 
fund. 
McLeod and Malhotra (2001) regress the expense ratio of a sample of 
funds ranging from 658 in 1989 to 927 in 1991 over the following variables: 
size, age and a set of dummy variables identifying growth and income funds, 
load-funds and other dummy variables of particular interest in the US 
institutional framework. They find a negative and statistically significant 
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impact of size (both in absolute value and in log transformation) and age, and 
positive and statistically significant impact for growth, load-funds. 
LaPlante (2001) finds that expense ratios for equity funds are negatively 
related to size and age of the fund; institutional and index funds are less 
expensive than retail and actively managed funds. For bond funds, size is no 
longer a significant regressor, except when employed in interaction with the 
investment objective. Fund age has a positive (and significant) impact on the 
expense ratio.  
The consideration of the impact of trading costs on mutual fund 
expenses became apparent with the seminal paper of Livingston and O’ Neal 
(1996) who studied mutual fund brokerage commission on a sample of 240 
mutual funds for the period 1989-1993. 
The brokerage commissions paid by mutual fund managers appear to be 
negatively and significantly correlated with fund size and positively and 
significantly correlated with the fund portfolio turnover and with the overall 
expense ratio. The relatively high size of the percentage commission paid is 
consistent with the hypothesis of soft dollars agreements (that is the inclusion in 
the brokerage commission of the payment of services other than trade execution 
– i.e. research, access to information providers, computer equipment, security 
analysis etc.). Conversely, since percentage commissions are positively 
correlated with the expense ratio, the hypothesis that fund managers who pay 
high commissions receive more services in the form of soft dollars and thus 
have lower direct cost is not confirmed (or at least they have lower costs but 
these are not passed along to fund investors in the form of lower management 
fees). 
Also Fortin and Michelson (1998) examine the problem of trading costs 
for mutual funds. Costs induced by the trading activity of mutual funds 
managers can be relevant and can reduce the performance of the investment 
activity; nevertheless, they are not reported or, which is worse, are disguised in 
the reporting of mutual funds. Moreover, they are not included in the 
calculation of the expense ratio, the measure of cost most widely recognized by 
mutual fund investors. Over a total of 3790 fund-year observations they find a 
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percentage brokerage cost of 31 basis points, equal to 22% of the average 
reported expense ratio in the corresponding time period. Brokerage costs are the 
highest for international equity funds and the lowest for government and 
municipal bond funds. The brokerage costs appear to be significantly and 
positively related to the turnover of the fund, to the annual expense ratio (which 
is surprising if one considers the soft dollar hypothesis but not if the hypothesis 
is that managers who are not good at controlling transaction costs tend to treat 
recklessly also other cost categories) and to a dummy variable for load-funds. 
They are negatively related to the size (measured in absolute or log terms) of 
the fund. 
In a recent working paper, Karcescki, Livingstone and O’ Neal (2004) 
study trading costs for a sample of US equity mutual funds and find an average 
annual explicit brokerage commissions of 38 basis points and an average annual 
implicit trading cost of 58 basis points. In some cases, the sum of explicit and 
implicit trading costs is higher than the published expense ratio, but mutual 
fund investors are mostly unaware of those costs because of the difficulty in 
obtaining information on explicit trading costs, and the unavailability of 
implicit trading costs. They find that the most important brokerage 
commissions determinants are the turnover ratio, expense ratios, the dummy 
variables international equity, small firms and index fund, while specialty funds 
pay lower commissions (this result is quite puzzling and it is explained by the 
authors with the greater focus of specialty fund managers on a small group of 
securities). Fund size does not exert any significant influence on the brokerage 
commissions.  
As for the Italian mutual fund industry, the paper of Cesari and Panetta 
(1998) studies style, fees and performance of Italian equity funds. In the section 
dedicated to mutual fund costs, they find that mutual fund management fees are 
negatively related to fund size, to fund age and positively related to the 
presence of incentive fees. When a bank controls the fund management 
company, management fees tend to be lower.  
The rapid expansion of mutual fund industry produced an increase in the 
number of mutual funds in the market. So  the issue of the economies of scale 
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in the mutual fund industry has become very important. If economies of scale 
exist, then fund expenses will decrease with every increase in the fund size.  
A lot studies, such as those of Sirri and Tufano (1998), Siggelkow 
(1998, 2003) Nanda, Wang and Zheng (2004), find that the impact of fund 
expenses on net flows is negative.  
In recent times mergers among mutual funds are fast emerging as a new 
phenomenon. As argued by Jamayraman, Khorana and Nelling (2002), with 
mergers, mutual funds can reduce the excess supply in the market and also gain 
from lower management costs due to economies of scale. 
Analysis of the existing literature suggests three main considerations 
and lines for further analysis: 
− there is a wide consensus and empirical proofs that some factors (size, 
age, turnover, management style etc.) affect mutual fund costs; 
− transaction costs are an important component of total costs borne by 
mutual funds but they are quite difficult to measure and to analyse; 
− the Italian market is underinvestigated. 
Our purpose is to extend the analysis to the Italian context with 
particular attention to the impact of transaction costs. 
 
 
DATA DESCRIPTION AND METHODOLOGY 
 
Italian open end mutual fund management companies are required to 
produce and to deliver (upon request) to mutual fund investors two main 
documents: the prospectus and the annual statement of information. The 
structure of both documents is mandatory (following both national and UE 
regulations) and, as far as the purposes of our analysis are concerned, they can 
be the source of the following information: 
− from the prospectus, the total expense ratio (in percentage of the average 
assets under management of each year) and its composition (in terms of 
cost items that are included in its calculation); 
− from the annual statement of information (again on annual basis) the 
total operating costs charged on the fund's assets, and from the 
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statement of additional information the breakdown of operating 
expenses (Part C, section IV) and the value of purchases and sales of 
securities. 
We collected data from prospectuses for the years 2000-2003 and from 
statements of annual information for the years 2001-2003. Our database allows 
for changes in the denomination of the fund (since the ISIN code remains 
unchanged), but it does not take into account changes in the investment policy 
as long as the ISIN code of the fund and its Assogestioni1 investment category 
are unchanged. 
Because of the difficulties encountered in collecting and manually 
inputting data, the object of our study is a selected group of funds . The 
coverage of our database is acceptable: it ranges from 54% (Equity Pacific) to 
90% (Money Market) in terms of yearly average assets under management. 
We first analyzed the total expense ratio (Ter) as it is drawn form the 
prospectus and defined as ratio between operating costs borne by the fund net 
assets (and so ultimately by the mutual fund investors) and yearly average asset 
under management2 (Aaum). The operating costs charged on the fund assets are 
the management fee, (also called investment advisory fee), the administrative 
costs, the bank depository fee, the distribution fees and other operating 
expenses. 
Summary statistics on the Ter for our sample are provided in table 1. 
Fund expenses are directly related to the fund management complexity (equity 
funds are more expensive than bond funds and than money market funds) and 
indirectly related with fund size (the average weighted by the asset under 
management is lower than the simple average). There is no clear time trend in 
fund expenses over the period under investigation. 
(insert table 1 about here) 
                                                 
1 Assogestioni (Associazione dell'Industria del Risparmio Gestito) is the body representing 
Italian fund management companies (Società di Gestione del Risparmio); it produces and 
distributes statistics on industry data (assets under management, subscriptions and redemptions 
of mutual fund shares etc.). 
2The average is calculated on the basis of end of month data. 
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Transaction costs are an important cost item in the determination of total 
costs incurred by mutual fund investors. They are clearly linked to the 
frequency and relevance of transactions decided by mutual fund managers and 
are composed of explicit costs (brokerage commissions) and of implicit costs 
(both in the form of execution and in the form of non-execution costs3) directly 
caused by the trading activity4. 
Italian mutual funds report information on explicit transaction costs5 
(brokerage commissions paid, Part D) in the statement of additional 
information. In order to investigate the transaction cost impact on the costs 
borne by equity mutual fund investors we built a detailed database spanning on 
the last three years of our sampling period. The number of funds in our sample 
and other descriptive statistics of relevance are exposed in table 2. We decided 
to limit the analysis of explicit transaction costs only to equity funds for two 
reasons: the amount of secondary market transactions of money market mutual 
funds in negligible when compared to their assets under management due to the 
short average maturity of their assets and usually bonds are traded on dealer 
markets, where it is not possible to obtain the transaction cost paid from the 
accounting documents, since it is embedded in the gross purchase or sale price. 
Data about explicit transaction costs were used to calculate the Total 
Expense and Commission Ratio6 (Tecr) defined as the ratio of the sum of 
operating costs plus brokerage commissions not included in operating costs to 
the yearly average asset under management. Summary statistics on the Tecr and 
                                                 
3 The reader is referred to the vast literature on transaction costs; for example Keim and 
Madhavan (1998), Perold (1988), Wayne and Edwards (1993). 
4 There is one more subtle cost indirectly linked to the transaction activity and it comes from 
the diversion of portfolio manager time and attention when she actively engages in frequent 
transactions and so under-allocates her time to other core asset management activities (Cassidy 
2004). 
5 The cost of trading is defined as the sum of all costs directly associated with trading and 
includes explicit costs (the only that are directly accounted for in the information provided by 
mutual fund companies, like commissions and taxes), implicit costs (given by the adverse 
impact that trades might have on market prices) and missed trade opportunity costs. For further 
details refer to Harris (2003). 
6 We drew the denomination of the aggregate under investigation from (Cassidy 2004). 
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on the incidence of explicit transaction cost on average yearly assets under 
management (Tcaum7) are reported in table 2. 
(insert table 2 about here) 
Three aspects are noticeable: 
− there is a remarkable lack of homogeneity in the treatment of brokerage 
commissions. The funds in the sample are almost evenly divided as far 
as the inclusion of brokerage commissions in "operating costs" and in 
"other costs"; 
− brokerage commissions represent a sizeable portion of the total costs 
charged on the mutual fund investor; on average they represent 44 basis 
points in terms of asset under management for equity funds in the 
sample with little variation from year to year and a slightly declining 
trend; 
− a high variability emerges. It remains to be explained whether the latter 
form of variability comes from true differences in the transaction 
behaviour (for example, some managers might be keener than other to 
negotiate hard for commission rebates or might be more active in their 
transaction style than others) or in differences in the reporting of 
brokerage commissions. 
 
14% of equity funds in our sample8 report no transaction costs9. Since 
we can expect that no equity fund has in a given year a zero portfolio turnover, 
there must be clearly not infrequent problems of reporting opacity. This is 
confirmed by the fact that, along with many fund management companies 
reporting brokerage commissions for all the funds managed, other do not report 
                                                 
7 The Tcaum statistic is not simply the difference between the total expense and commission 
ratio and the total expense ratio, because in some cases the brokerage commissions are included 
in the operating costs and in some cases they are not. 
8 When data are drawn from the annual statement of information data are limited to the three 
year period 2001-2003. 
9 There is no significant difference in the transparency among different equity fund categories. 
Equity funds specialized in market where securities are mostly traded in order driven markets 
(like the ones specialized in domestic equities) show no appreciable difference from funds 
specialized securities mostly traded in quote driven markets (like US equity). 
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explicit transaction costs for any of the fund managed by them or only for a 
fraction of the funds managed. 
The main cost component (table 3) is given by commission fees, 
followed, for equity funds, by brokerage fees and for bond and money market 
funds by bank depository fees. 
(insert table 3 about here) 
We noticed a remarkable tendency of commission fees to cluster around 
a few focal points that account, especially for equity funds, for most of the 
frequency distribution (table 4). Fund management companies appear to follow 
a not very competitive stance towards the pricing of the management service 
they provide to investors. 
(insert table 4 about here) 
For the issue of economies of scale, we first estimate a translog cost 
function to determine which factors contribute to economies of scale and their 
degree of importance. Then we estimate the cost elasticity with respect to assets 
taking the first derivative of the translog function. We create subsets in order to 
measure cost elasticity for different groups according to the size of funds10 and 
the category (bond, money market and equity). Panel data analysis shows that 
on average there are no economies of scale over the period under investigation. 
 
 
MODEL SPECIFICATION AND RESULTS 
 
Next we examined some factor affecting the total expense ratio and the 
total expense and commission ratio to address the issue of the determinants of 
mutual fund expenses ( according both to the fund prospectus definition   and to 
our proposed methodology). 
The variables under scrutiny are reported in table 5. Their rationale is 
the following:  
− average yearly assets under management (SIZE) of the fund. It is 
expected to capture the effect of scale economies in the portfolio 
management process and the market power exerted by bigger funds on 
                                                 
10 Size categories are defined as percentiles of yearly average asset under management: (1) ≤ 
€50million; (2) €50m.¬€250m.; (3) €250m.¬€500m.; (4) €500m.¬€750m.; (5) >€750m. 
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external services providers (i.e. depository banks, brokerage firms, etc.). 
Greater assets under management should thus translate into lower 
unitary costs;  
− average yearly assets under management of the fund management 
company (SIZECOMP) could account for the possibility of economies 
of scope and for the market power of the management company. If a 
fund is managed by a big management company, all other things being 
equal, it could have lower expenses since it could benefit from common 
costs that can be spread over a larger base; 
− degree of activism of fund investors (ACTIV), given by the sum of fund 
underwritings and reimbursements divided by the average yearly assets 
under management. The ordinary way in which Italian mutual fund 
investors buy and sell open end mutual fund shares is not via secondary 
market transactions but via underwriting of new shares and 
reimbursement of shares held. This can be expected to induce a strain 
over the cash management of the fund and to enhance transaction costs 
(and total costs) that the fund has to face in order to meet the 
reimbursement requests; 
− the age (AGE) of the fund, measured in number of months since the 
creation of the fund. Older funds are likely to be larger than younger 
funds and the latter are normally created in a process of product 
differentiation in which the management companies identify some new 
and more expensive product (i.e. hyper-specialized funds). Finally, 
younger funds might be managed by less experienced money managers, 
who are at the earlier stages of their learning curve. Thus older funds 
could be expected to be less expensive than younger ones; 
− R2 (RSQ), the coefficient of determination (goodness of fit of the fund 
returns to the fund's benchmark returns). It identifies the management 
style of the fund, discriminating passively managed funds (the ones with 
high R2) from actively managed funds (the ones with low R2); the 
rationale behind that distinction is that the cost of the two different 
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styles should differ because active management absorbs more resources 
than passive management; 
− similarly, the β (BETA) of the fund (calculated by the ordinary market 
model with respect to the fund's benchmark) measures the degree of 
aggressiveness of the management style. Funds with higher β are likely 
to be more expensive to run in terms of research and amount of 
information needed than more conservative funds; 
− the turnover (TURN) of the portfolio, measured by the sum of purchases 
and sales of securities divided by the average yearly assets under 
management, distinguishes funds that engage in an intense trading 
activity from the others. A more intense trading activity should translate 
in higher transaction costs; 
− a dummy variable (DDEQ) separates funds that are specialized in Italian 
equities from others, under the hypothesis that investment in domestic 
equity are likely to be less expensive in terms of research, transaction 
costs and settlement and depository costs than international equity 
funds; 
− a dummy variable (IND) separates funds that are managed by 
companies owned by a bank from others. When a fund management 
company belongs to a bank conglomerate, on one side, we can expect 
lower transaction costs due to scope and scale economies at the 
conglomerate level. Conversely, when a management company is part 
of a bank conglomerate, costs might be higher due to both its higher 
market power in the distribution phase towards the bank customers and 
to some form of transfer pricing within the conglomerate. In the latter 
case, if the fund management industry is relatively less competitive than 
other markets served by the bank conglomerate, we can expect higher 
costs because of a rent exploiting behaviour. 
(insert table 5 about here) 
The regression models were tested for equity funds and for the 
following dependent variables: total expense ratio, total expense and 
commission ratio and transaction costs over assets under management. 
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Ter = a + b1 SIZE + b2 SIZECONG + b3 ACTIV + b4 AGE + b5 RSQ + 
+ b6 BETA + b7 TURN + b8 DDEQ + b9 IND + e    
 [1] 
 
Tecr = a + b1 SIZE + b2 SIZECONG + b3 ACTIV + b4 AGE + b5 RSQ + 
+ b6 BETA + b7 TURN + b8 DDEQ + b9 IND + e    
 [2] 
 
Tcaum = a + b1 SIZE + b2 SIZECONG + b3 ACTIV + b4 AGE + b5 RSQ + 
+ b6 BETA + b7 TURN + b8 DDEQ + b9 IND + e    
 [3] 
 
(insert table 6 about here) 
The results, shown in table 6, suggest that: 
− size of the managed fund (SIZE) has a statistically significant and 
negative impact on mutual fund costs. Bigger equity funds tend to show 
lower expenses, after controlling for the other independent variables, 
than smaller funds both when measured against Ter and against Tecr 
(the definition of expenses including explicit transaction costs). This is 
an indication of the existence of scale economies in the production 
process of mutual fund management. The influence of size is no more 
significant when the dependent variable are the transaction costs only; 
the sign remains negative, but the coefficient is not significantly 
different from zero; 
− the size of the management company (SIZECOMP) exhibits a 
statistically significant and negative impact on costs for all the 
dependent variables under investigation, indicating the existence of 
scope economies. Funds that are managed by a company characterized 
by a higher amount of total assets under management have lower 
expenses than others because they can benefit from common costs 
sharing and company wide learning curve effects;  
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− the management style of the fund (measured by its R2 - RSQ) has the 
expected effect on mutual fund expenses. Funds with higher R2 are less 
costly than fund more actively managed and thus with lower R2; 
− the turnover of the fund portfolio (TURNOVER) is directly related to 
mutual fund costs – funds engaging in a greater portfolio turnover pay 
higher transaction costs - only when these are measured with the 
definitions that include the explicit transaction costs (Tecr) or are 
focused on them (Tcaum), while the coefficient is not statistically 
significant when its impact is measured against the Ter; 
− a similar effect is observed with reference to the dummy variable 
domestic equity (DDEQ). The cost advantage coming from investing in 
domestic equities is apparent only when its effect is measured with 
reference to the Tecr and the Tcaum: trading domestic shares (on the 
domestic market where the vast majority of domestic equities are listed) 
is less expensive than trading foreign shares (on foreign markets); 
− independent management companies (DIND) tend to have lower costs 
when these are measured in term of the simple Ter, while the effect is 
more straightforward when costs are defined as inclusive of transaction 
costs (Tecr) or limited only to transaction costs (Tcaum); 
− the degree of fund shares underwriters' activism (ACTIV), the age of the 
fund (AGE) and the beta (BETA) of the fund do not show any 
significant impact over the different cost definitions. 
 
In financial economics, the translog model is the most pervasive 
approach for investigating economies of scale. It implicitly implies an U - 
shaped average cost function and is useful to measure the economies of scale 
according to different level of fund assets. The translog function requires cost 
and output measures. The output of mutual funds is total asset under 
management. Total cost for each fund is defined as the total expenses, including 
the management fee. Fund’s total expenses are modelled as function of total 
assets and of control variables that affect the level of expenses (see Eq. [4]). 
OLS regression is used to find coefficients for the independent variables. 
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( )20 1 21Ln Cost =  ln SIZE ln SIZE2 j jj X eβ β β β+ + + +∑    [4] 
 
Ln Cost is the natural logarithm of the amount of total expenses, SIZE 
represents the yearly average asset under management of each fund, and jX  
includes control factors that affect the costs. 
(Insert table 7 about here) 
We run separate regression for each year and for the period 2000-2003. 
The results are shown in table 8 
(Insert table 8 about here) 
Some of these results are expected. Adjusted RSQ is large for all four 
years, which means that the translog function is well specified for explaining 
economies of scale. The translog function explains 92%-94% of the variability 
of funds' costa for each of the four years. The natural logarithm of SIZE has 
positive coefficient estimates, as expected because the level of assets directly 
affects funds' costs. But the effect is more than proportional, because the value 
is greater than 1 and statistically significant for all the years. The ACTIV 
coefficients are statistically significant and negative related to the economies of 
scale for all four years. It implies economies of scale for the funds with higher 
number of operations. 
Three coefficients of LnSIZECOMP are positive and one is negative; 
they are small values and not statistically significant for three years (2001, 2002 
and 2003), which means that there is no clear evidence of relationship between 
economies of scale and the size of the company. AGE effect is small and not 
statistically significant. The negative sign means that older funds can reduce 
costs better than younger funds. The coefficients of the BETA are not 
statistically significant, while the degree of activism RSQ has a positive and 
statistically significant impact for all four years, as expected because of the 
higher management costs. The number of funds NF has a small relation with 
respect to the costs; its coefficients change the sign over the four year period 
and are not statistically significant. 
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The most common measure of operating efficiency in economies of 
scale is the elasticity of cost with respect to the output. Taking the first 
derivative of translog function with respect to the asset, we obtain this measure:  
 ( )
( ) ( )1 2= ln SIZE
LnCOST
LnSIZE
β β∂ +∂        [5] 
 
When the rate of increase in output exceeds the rate of increase in cost 
in an industry, then economies of scale characterize that industry. For mutual 
fund industry, if expenses increase less than proportionately with changes in 
fund assets then economies of scale exist. Cost elasticity is computed for the 
whole panel, for fund size and fund category, using the model in Equation 5. 
The main results are:  
− average cost elasticity for the whole panel shows no economies of scale 
over the period 2000-2003;  
− there is a positive relation between economies of scale exist and fund 
size; 
− average cost elasticity of equity funds and bond funds show 
diseconomies of scale over the period 2000-2003. 
 
(Insert table 9 about here) 
 
 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
In this paper we analysed Italian open end mutual fund costs with the 
objectives of collecting some new pieces of information on the Italian market 
and of investigating the determinants of mutual fund costs in the Italian context. 
Our analysis showed a quite composite landscape, characterized both by 
a low level of transparency from mutual fund management companies and by 
an insufficient awareness of the importance of costs from mutual fund 
investors. The collection of the data needed for the realization of our analysis 
was an extremely time consuming task, mainly because of the lack of an 
accessible database. 
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We found that mutual fund costs are sizeable and show no sign of 
decline over time. Management fees are the main cost component. 
Transaction costs are an important component of the total cost borne by 
the mutual fund investors, but, differently from the Ter and the percentage 
management fee, they are not reported in an accessible manner to the investors 
(i.e. in the prospectus). 
The prospectus is normally seen as an instrument for first time investors 
and the annual report is the natural source of information for existing 
shareholders (Cassidy, 2004). We deem to be advisable that the management 
companies report them in due light both in the prospectus and in the annual 
report. 
When selecting equity funds, the cost aware investor should select the 
ones characterized by big size, managed by a large management company, with 
a passive management style, specialized in Italian equity. Other factors 
examined seemed to be, in our sample, less influential. 
Mutual fund management companies show a very mild degree of 
competition on the management commissions that are clustered around a few 
focal points. 
A higher level of transparency would help investors to select lower-cost 
funds; the resulting harsher competition would drive actions by mutual fund 
companies to lower fees and expenses in order to attract cost aware investors. 
We looked at economies of scale over a four year period, from 2000 to 
2003. Cost elasticity has been variable over the years. Average cost elasticity of 
the Italian mutual fund industry does not show economies of scale over the 
period 2000-2003. On an average, funds with larger size show greater 
economies of scale. Equity funds and bond funds show an average elasticity 
value greater than 1 over the period 2000-2003. For equity funds, this is 
particularly due to the diseconomies of scale encountered in year 2000. A 
reason may be referred to the increase of equity fund supply in 2000, thanks to 
the introduction of specialised equity funds. Bond funds show no noticeable 
changes in cost elasticity, notwithstanding the decreasing of yearly average 
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asset under management. Money market funds’ average cost elasticity is less 
than 1 over the 4 years and their size increased over the period 2000-2003. 
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Table 1 - Total Expense Ratio 
This table presents summary statistics for the Total Expense Ratio (Ter) of a sample of 
open end mutual funds managed by Italian management companies. In panel B we 
present the evolution of the Ter for a closed subsample of funds with observations for 
the complete period of four years. 
 
Panel A 
Equity 
Whole 
sample 
full period 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Mean 0,0224 0,0227 0,0209 0,0214 0,0246 
Median  0,0204  0,0200 0,0195 0,0201  0,0224 
St. Dev.  0,0072  0,0084 0,0066 0,0053  0,0078 
Weighted Average  0,0223  0,0245 0,0202 0,0209  0,0226 
N. obs 1251  259 312 332  348 
Money market 
Mean 0,0073 0,0079 0,0077 0,0071 0,0067 
Median 0,0071 0,0076 0,0075 0,0071 0,0066 
St. Dev. 0,0025 0,0029 0,0026 0,0022 0,0021 
Weighted Average 0,0070 0,0080 0,0072 0,0069 0,0068 
N. obs. 142 31 35 36 40 
Bond 
Mean 0,0124 0,0118 0,0125 0,0124 0,0128 
Median 0,0118 0,0115 0,0117 0,0118 0,0119 
St. Dev. 0,0032 0,0030 0,0030 0,0031 0,0037 
Weighted Average 0,0112 0,0115 0,0116 0,0113 0,0107 
N. obs. 453 97 113 122 121 
 
Panel B 
Equity 
Closed sample  2000 2001 2002 2003 
Mean  0,0228 0,0204 0,0211 0,0242 
Median  0,0200 0,0193 0,0202 0,0223 
St. Dev.  0,0084 0,0053 0,0044 0,0066 
N. obs.  247 247 247 247 
Money market  
Mean  0,0079 0,0073 0,0070 0,0068 
Median  0,0079 0,0072 0,0069 0,0066 
St. Dev.  0,0030 0,0025 0,0022 0,0022 
N. obs.  30 30 30 30 
Bond 
Mean  0,0120 0,0126 0,0125 0,0129 
Median  0,0118 0,0118 0,0120 0,0120 
St. Dev.  0,0029 0,0030 0,0028 0,0036 
N. obs.  92 92 92 92 
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Table 2 - Total Expense and Commission Ratio 
This table presents summary statistics for the Total Expense and Commission Ratio (Tecr) and 
of the incidence of explicit transaction cost over average yearly assets under management 
(Tcaum) for a sample of equity open end mutual funds managed by Italian management 
companies. 
 
Tecr Full period 2001 2002 2003 
Mean 0,0253 0,0243 0,0242 0,0271 
Median 0,0237 0,0224 0,0228 0,0253 
St. Dev. 0,0068 0,0071 0,0061 0,0068 
Weighted Average 0,0242 0,0235 0,0241 0,0252 
N. obs. 739 210 262 267 
 
Tcaum Full period 2001 2002 2003 
Mean 0,00438 0,00498 0,00426 0,00402 
Median 0,00289 0,00304 0,00271 0,00294 
St. Dev. 0,00452 0,00521 0,00453 0,00386 
Weighted Average 0,00360 0,00429 0,00313 0,00326 
N. obs. 647 181 232 234 
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Table 3 - Cost components 
This table presents the weight of the main components of the Total Expense and Commission 
Ratio (Tecr). 
 
 
Management fees 
 Full period 2001 2002 2003 
Equity 0,8043 0,7796 0,8114 0,8295 
Money market 0,8829 0,8682 0,8928 0,8833 
Bond 0,9060 0,9036 0,9090 0,9058 
Overall 0,8371 0,8129 0,8425 0,8575 
 
 
Bank depository Fees 
Equity 0,0485 0,0506 0,0482 0,0461 
Money market 0,1119 0,1233 0,1007 0,1133 
Bond 0,0809 0,0813 0,0781 0,0836 
Overall 0,0649 0,0631 0,0613 0,0702 
 
 
Brokerage commissions 
Equity 0,1314 0,1570 0,1146 0,1155 
Money market 0,0009 0,0006 0,0004 0,0013 
Bond 0,0062 0,0063 0,0064 0,0059 
Overall 0,0858 0,1125 0,0770 0,0659 
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Table 4 - Focal points in management fees 
This table presents the focal points at which the percentage management fees tend to cluster. 
The source is the prospectus.  
 
Equity Money market Bond 
Mode                             1,80% Mode                             0,60% Mode                             1,00% 
Commission                Freq. % Commission                Freq. % Commission                Freq. % 
            1,50%                    16,3            0,50%                       8,8             0,80%                      9,9 
            1,60%                      9,3            0,60%                     21,9             0,90%                      7,7 
            1,70%                      4,3            0,70%                       6,9             1,00%                    27,4 
            1,80%                    24,5             other                     62,5             1,10%                      5,7 
            1,90%                      6,9              1,20%                      9,6 
            2,00%                      5,7                other                   39,7 
              other                  33,0   
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Table 5 - Variables and measures 
This table lists the variables employed in the regression analysis, their measures and their expected effect 
on the dependent variables under scrutiny. 
 
Variable Measure Expected sign 
on Ter 
Expected sign 
on Tecr 
Expected sign 
on Tcaum 
SIZE Average yearly assets under management - - - 
SIZECONG Average yearly assets under management 
of the fund management company 
- - - 
ACTIV turnover of the asset under management 
of the fund, given by the sum of yearly 
subscriptions and redemptions divided by 
the yearly average assets under 
management 
+ + + 
AGE number of months since the creation of 
the fund 
- - - 
RSQ goodness of fit of the fund returns to the 
fund's benchmark returns 
- - - 
BETA coefficient of the ordinary market model 
with respect to the fund's benchmark 
+ + + 
TURN sum of purchases and sales of securities 
divided by the average yearly assets 
under management 
+ + + 
DDEQ dummy variable, equal to 1 for funds 
specialized in Italian equities domestic 
equity 
- - - 
DIND dummy variable, equal to 1 if the fund is 
not managed by a company controlled by 
a bank 
? ? ? 
 
 29
Table 6 - Regression analysis 
This table shows the regressions results for the model  
Ter = a + b1 SIZE + b2 SIZECONG + b3 ACTIV + b4 AGE + b5 RSQ + 
+ b6 BETA + b7 TURN + b8 DDEQ + b9 IND + e 
The same model is employed for the dependent variables Tecr and Tcaum 
 
Dependent variable Ter Tecr Tcaum 
Independent Variables:    
Intercept 0,042 0,046 0,010 
t 13,575 13,935 4,380 
prob. 0,000 0,000 0,000 
SIZE -0,0000023 -0,0000021 -0,00000023 
t -3,286 -3,670 -0,406 
prob. 0,001 0,000 0,685 
SIZECOMP -0,00000009 -0,00000015 -0,00000018 
t -2,396 -3,670 -6,319 
prob. 0,017 0,000 0,000 
ACTIV 0,00054 0,00050 0,00057 
t 1,707 1,427 2,315 
prob. 0,088 0,154 0,021 
AGE -0,000011 -0,0000048 -0,0000036 
t -2,378 -0,925 -0,989 
prob. 0,018 0,356 0,323 
RSQ -0,016 -0,021 -0,008 
t -5,912 -6,979 -3,773 
prob. 0,000 0,000 0,000 
BETA -0,0024 -0,0010 0,00084 
t -1,225 -0,486 0,556 
prob. 0,221 0,627 0,578 
TURN 0,000011 0,00041 0,00041 
t 0,236 8,093 9,768 
prob. 0,813 0,000 0,000 
DDEQ -0,0014 -0,0035 -0,0024 
t -1,994 -4,675 -4,459 
prob. 0,047 0,000 0,000 
DIND -0,0042 -0,0020 0,0022 
t -4,262 -1,842 2,637 
prob. 0,000 0,066 0,009 
F-Test 12,153 20,060 20,683 
Prob>F 0,000 0,000 0,000 
Adj.RSQ 0,121 0,186 0,210 
OBS 729 751 667 
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Table 7 - Translog function: variables and measures 
This table lists the variables employed in the translog function, their measures and their expected effect on 
the dependent variables under scrutiny. 
 
Variable Measure Expected sign 
SIZE Average yearly assets under 
management 
- 
Ln SIZECOMP Natural logarithm of the average 
yearly assets under management of 
the fund management company 
? 
ACTIV turnover of the asset under 
management of the fund, given by the 
sum of yearly subscriptions and 
redemptions divided by the yearly 
average assets under management 
+ 
AGE number of months since the creation 
of the fund 
- 
RSQ goodness of fit of the fund returns to 
the fund's benchmark returns 
- 
BETA coefficient of the ordinary market 
model with respect to the fund's 
benchmark 
+ 
NF number of funds family - 
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Table 8 – Translog function: regression analysis 
This table shows the regressions results for the model: 
( )20 1 21Ln Cost =  ln SIZE ln SIZE2 j jj X eβ β β β+ + + +∑  
Panel data results are based on the 1203 observations formed by pooling the cross sectional and 
time series data for the period 2000-2003 
 
Dependent variable 
2000 2001 2002 2003 
Panel data 
model 2000 - 
2003 
Independent Variables:  Ln Cost 
Intercept -4,6874 -4,2967 -4,5817 -4,7953 -4,6453
t -14,7912 -18,4726 -23,8453 -24,3533 -41,6704
prob. 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000
Ln SIZE 1,4134 1,0167 1,0530 1,0976 1,0764
t 12,3028 17,9820 20,6131 21,8861 35,6537
prob. 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000
(Ln SIZE)2 -0,0320 -0,0098 -0,0146 -0,0231 -0,0153
t -2,9491 -1,6010 -2,6582 -4,4283 -4,8913
prob. 0,0035 0,1105 0,0083 0,0000 0,0000
ACTIV -0,1159 -0,1226 -0,1026 -0,0507 -0,0948
t -3,8349 -3,7649 -4,1978 -1,6492 -6,5627
prob. 0,0002 0,0002 0,0000 0,1001 0,0000
Ln SIZECOMP -0,1163 0,0094 0,0244 0,0565 0,0197
t -3,0561 0,3473 1,0767 2,4774 1,4919
prob. 0,0025 0,7286 0,2824 0,0137 0,1360
AGE -0,0006 -0,0004 0,0001 -0,0004 -0,0003
t -0,8760 -0,7919 0,1580 -0,9403 -1,1177
prob. 0,3819 0,4291 0,8746 0,3478 0,2639
BETA -0,0019 -0,0620 -0,0475 -0,0932 -0,0536
t -0,0375 -1,4558 -1,1963 -2,0373 -2,3520
prob. 0,9701 0,1466 0,2325 0,0424 0,0188
RSQ 0,5673 0,6816 0,7268 0,7795 0,7945
t 3,5399 4,9713 6,0779 5,6619 11,6750
prob. 0,0005 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000
NF 0,0076 0,0013 -0,0008 0,0017 0,0014
t 1,8036 0,3806 -0,2499 0,5002 0,7912
prob. 0,0725 0,7038 0,8028 0,6173 0,4290
F-Test 384 507 632 516 1952
Prob. > F 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000
Adj. RSQ 0,9242 0,9341 0,9401 0,9237 0,9285
OBS 252 287 323 341 1203
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Table 9 – Cost elasticity 
This table shows the summary statistics for the cost elasticity measure. 
 
Average cost elasticity 
 
2000 2001 2002 2003 
panel 
data 
Number of funds 252 287 323 341 1203
Cost elasticity 1,237 0,965 0,945 0,986 0,998
 
 
Elasticity by fund size 
 Panel data Group_1 Group_2 Group_3 Group_4 Group_5 
Mean 0,998 1,062 1,031 0,999 0,973 0,952 
Median 0,996 1,056 1,030 0,998 0,973 0,954 
Min. 0,928 1,050 1,019 0,983 0,961 0,928 
Max 1,097 1,097 1,050 1,018 0,983 0,960 
St. dev.. 0,026 0,014 0,008 0,009 0,006 0,007 
Skewness 0,476 1,197 0,390 0,308 -0,194 -1,214 
Kurtosis 0,383 0,074 -0,903 -0,852 -1,136 1,539 
N. obs. 1203 44 204 618 264 72 
 
Elasticity by fund category 
 Panel data Money Market Equity Bond 
Mean 0,998 0,915 1,030 1,047 
Median 0,996 0,914 0,976 1,046 
Min. 0,928 0,768 0,914 0,980 
Max 1,097 0,996 1,333 1,140 
St. dev. 0,026 0,044 0,113 0,032 
Skewness 0,476 -0,094 1,381 0,353 
Kurtosis 0,383 0,237 0,296 -0,167 
N. obs. 1203 129 803 271 
 
Yearly average elasticity by fund category 
 Average 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Panel data 0,998 1,237 0,965 0,945 0,986 
Money Market 0,915 0,982 0,865 0,913 0,913 
Equity 1,030 1,246 0,943 0,970 1,006 
Bond 1,047 1,080 1,019 1,043 1,049 
 
Average asset under management by category 
AUMM Equity Monetary Bond 
2000      526,407      690,124     785,073 
2001      356,341      991,886     709,146 
2002      240,851   1.788,201     564,587 
2003      191,528   2.478,601     593,556 
 
